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George Mackenzie on Scottish Judicial Rhetoric
Abstract: George Mackenzie’s “What Eloquence is t for the Bar”
(1672), perhaps unique in the early modern literature of Scots law,
provides access to the state of judicial rhetoric in post-Restoration
Scotland. This essay summarizes the contents of the essay and
briey relates it to his career and other writings. It shows that
Mackenzie conceived of eloquence as a site of struggle for personal,
professional, and international status.
S
ir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh was as an advocate,
member of parliament, founder of the Advocates’ Library,
and popularly known as “bluidy Mackenzie” for his pros-
ecution of Covenanters while serving as Lord Advocate for Charles II
beginning in 1677.1 A signicant gure in Scottish political and legal
history, Mackenzie wrote two importantworks on Scots law.2 As well,
he wrote two essays on judicial rhetoric. The rst, “What Eloquence
is t for the Bar,” preceded sample pleadings published in Pleadings
in some remarkable cases before the Supreme Court of Scotland since 1661,
1Robert Chambers, Traditions of Edinburgh (Edinburgh: Chambers, 1967) p. 224;
George W. T. Omond, The Lord Advocates of Scotland: From the Close of the Fifteenth
Century to the Passing of the Reform Bill, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1883) pp. 213–24; Alex M.
Cain, “Sir George Mackenzie and the Art of Librarianship,” in Oratio Inauguralis In
Aperienda Jurisconsultorum Bibliotheca, by Sir George Mackenzie, eds. John W. Cairns
and Alex M. Cain (Edinburgh: Butterworths, 1989) pp. 36–45.
2He wrote an important work on Scottish criminal law, and his Institutions of the
Law of Scotland (1688) served as a university textbook for teaching Scots law until the
1750s (John W. Cairns, “The Moveable Text of Mackenzie: Bibliographical Problems
for the Scottish Concept of Institutional Writing,” Critical Studies in Ancient Law,
Comparative Law and Legal History, eds. John W. Cairns and Olivia F. Robinson (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2001): p. 236; David M. Walker, The Scottish Jurists (Edinburgh: Green,
1985) pp. 162–63, 164–66).
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to which the Decisions are subjoined (1672).3 The second, “Idea elo-
quentiae forensis hodierni” (1681), preceded six sample pleadings
published in a work of the same name.4 I am aware of only four
places in scholarship on the history of rhetoric where Mackenzie’s
essays on rhetoric are mentioned. All mention Mackenzie in pass-
ing, three treat only the latter essay in any detail, and two seem to
consider it to be an English rhetoric.5 Nor do legal historians give
either of Mackenzie’s works on judicial rhetoric much if any atten-
tion, probably because they are not sources of Scots law but rather
exercises in judicial eloquence.6 Mackenzie, however, did want to
3Citations are to the following edition and provided parenthetically in the text:
The Works of that Eminent and Learned Lawyer, Sir George Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, vol.
1 (Edinburgh, 1716) pp. 9–102. Pleadings is in the second part of the volume: “Treatises
on the Laws of Scotland, and Pleadings Before Its Supreme Judicatories; With Their
Decisions.” Pleadings was rst published in 1672 and reprinted in 1673 and 1704 (F. S.
Ferguson, “A Bibliography of the Works of Sir George Mackenzie, Lord Advocate,
Founder of the Advocates Library,” Edinburgh Bibliographical Society Transactions 1
(1935–6) pp. 21–22).
4The subtitle is: Uná cum Actione Forensi ex unaquaque: Juris parte. It was published
in Edinburgh, 1681. For an English translation see Robert Hepburn, An Idea of the
Modern Eloquence of the Bar. Together with a Pleading out of every Part of Law (Edinburgh,
1711).
5William Phillips Sandford, English Theories of Public Address, 1530–1828 (n.p.,
1931) p. 122; Glen McClish, “Henry Fielding, the Novel, and Classical Legal Rhetoric,”
Rhetorica 14 (1996) pp. 415, 435; and Sean Patrick O’Rourke, “The Rhetoric of Law in
the Scottish Enlightenment,” unpublished PhD diss. U of Oregon, 1992, p. 79. John
W. Cairns, “Rhetoric, Language, and Roman Law: Legal Education and Improvement
in Eighteenth-Century Scotland,” Law and History Review 9 (1991) pp. 33–34 focuses on
the essay in Pleadings.
6Neither J. Irvine Smith, “The Rise of Modern Scots Law, 1660–1707,” An Intro-
duction to Scottish Legal History (Edinburgh: Stair Society, 1958) pp. 44–49, nor James
S. Leadbetter, “The Printed Law Reports,” An Introductory Survey of the Sources and
Literature of Scots Law (Edinburgh: Stair Society, 1936) pp. 42–58, for example, lists
Mackenzie’s works on judicial eloquence among collections of decisions even though
both works include cases relevant to titles in Scots law with statements of the deci-
sions. See also Walker, Jurists, pp. 164, 168.About some of the cases in Pleadings Walker
observes: “one suspects that like Cicero’s speeches for the defence, they were polished
for publication. Some . . . seem rather exercises than discourses delivered in actual
cases” (p. 162). Likewise, T. B. Smith describes Mackenzie’s Pleadings as being “for the
instruction of Scottish lawyers” (“The Inuence of the ‘Auld Alliance’ with France
on the Law of Scotland,” Studies Critical and Comparative (Edinburgh: Green, 1962) p.
35). John W. Cairns, “George Mackenzie, the Faculty of Advocates, and the Advo-
cates’ Library,” in Oratio Inauguralis, pp. 18–35 is necessary reading. Hugh Ouston’s
“Cultural Life from the Restoration to the Union,” The History of Scottish Literature,
1660–1800, vol. 2, ed. Andrew Hook (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987) pp.
11–31 provides a concise but comprehensive account of Mackenzie and other members
of the Scottish professional class with attention to the social, economic, political, and
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unite law and rhetoric.7 His essays on judicial rhetoric deserve atten-
tion because they may be unique in the early modern literature of
Scots law and, as such, provide some access to the state of the art
of judicial rhetoric in post-Restoration Scotland as well as rhetoric
more generally.8
“Idea eloquentiae forensis hodierni” contributed to Mackenzie’s
European reputation.9 Besides the testimonies of praise included in
Mackenzie’s Works from the likes of Voet, Huber, and the universities
of Oxford and Bourges, “Idea eloquentiae forensis hodierni” was
discussed in the Journal de Paris in the same year that it appeared.10
Gibert included a précis of the essay in his 1719 Jugemens des Savans
sur les Auteurs qui ont traité de la Rhétorique.11 Thus was in a manner
fullled Mackenzie’s hope for fame beyond the English-speaking
world by publishing his pleadings in Latin.12
Mackenzie’s earlier essay on judicial rhetoric has not received
as much notice as the later essay in Mackenzie’s day or since. The
fact that it is written in English helps to account for why it did
not receive much notice abroad. Mackenzie’s allegiance to Charles
II and James VII helps to account for why it did not receive much
attention in England or Scotland. Because Pleadingsdeals more partic-
ularly with Scottish judicial rhetoric, and because this is the subject
I hope to illuminate, I will summarize its contents and relate it to
religious history of the period. Andrew Lang, Sir George Mackenzie, King’s Advocate,
of Rosehaugh: His Life and Times, 1636 (?)-1691 (New York: Longmans, 1909) pp. 318–20
provides a brief summary of “What Eloquence is t for the Bar.”
7In his inauguraloration for the Advocates’ Library, Mackenziedescribes rhetoric,
as well as history and criticism, as the handmaidens of jurisprudence (trans. James
H. Loudon, rpt. in Oratio Inauguralis, p. 73). See also O’Rourke, “The Rhetoric of Law”,
pp. 79–80. Mackenzie’s desire to unite law and rhetoric is rooted in his humanism
(Cairns, “Mackenzie,” pp. 18, 19, 26).
8In his inaugural oration, Mackenzie mentions that only the French have pub-
lished their pleadings, “which were distinguished alike for eloquence and learning”
(p. 66). For a bibliography of French pleadings, see Catherine E. Holmès, L’Eloquence
Judiciaire de 1620 à 1660: Reet des Problèmes Sociaux, Religieux et Politiques de l’Époque
(Paris: Nizet, 1967). I have found no comparable Scottish collections of pleadings or
references to such collections.
9Cairns, “Mackenzie,” pp. 19–20.
10BalthazarGibert, Jugemens des Savans sur les Auteurs qui ont traité de la Rhétorique,
avec un précis de la doctrine de ces auteurs. Tome III. Et dernier, contenant les maistres les plus
fameux qui ont écrit de l’eloquence dans les derniers temps (Paris, 1719) p. 150.
11On Gibert, see Marc Fumaroli, L’Age de L’Eloquence: Rhétorique et ‘res literaria’
de la Renaissance au seuil de l’époque classique (Genève: Droz, 1980) pp. 2–3.
12See the dedication to “Idea eloquentiae forensis hodierni” and his inaugural
oration (pp. 66, 71).
R H E T O R I C A278
Mackenzie’s career. By doing so we see that rhetoric was a site of
struggle for professional, sociopolitical, and international status, and
that success in these areas rather than civic goods were rhetoric’s
raison d’être.
Rhetoric in Mackenzie’s training and early works
Mackenzie, born in 1636 or 1638 at Dundee in Scotland,13 rst at-
tended King’s College, Aberdeen, in 1650; and joined the fourth
year’s class at St. Leonard’s College, St. Andrews, in 1653.14 At
King’s College in 1647 the arts curriculum included Vossius’ rhetoric
and Ramus’ dialectic, as well as Aristotle’s Categories, Analytics, and
Logic; and probably the arts curriculum at St. Andrews was simi-
larly weighted towards Aristotle and involved regular disputations.15
Mackenzie’s training, then, would feature syllogistic reasoning and
foster a view of eloquence as primarily a verbal technique and as
a way of working on the audience’s minds, particularly emotions.16
After St. Andrews, Mackenzie is said to have attended law school
at Bourges in France and perhaps also in the Netherlands.17 His
stay on the continent to study civil law was typical of a Scots
advocate’s training at this time and into the eighteenth century.18
This legal training would be in Latin and involve explication of
and disputations on themes in Roman law, as well as attention
to eloquence.19 In “Idea eloquentiae forensis hodierni” Mackenzie
13Lang argues for the later date (Sir George MacKenzie, p. 22).
14Lang, Sir George MacKenzie, p. 24.
15James Scotland, The History of Scottish Education: From the Beginning to 1872
(London: University of London Press, 1969) pp. 143, 70–71.
16See C. S.M. Rademaker, Life and Work of Geradus Joannes Vossius (1577–1649),
trans. H. P. Doezema (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1981) pp. 179–80 and Thomas M. Conley,
Rhetoric in the European Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) pp.
160–61. In “What Eloquence” Mackenzie describes eloquence as “the true Key of the
Passions” (p. 12).
17Cairns, “Mackenzie,” p. 18.
18Alexander Murdoch, “The Advocates, the Law and the Nation in Early Modern
Scotland,” Lawyers in Early Modern Europe and America, ed. Wilfrid Prest (London:
Croom Helm, 1981) p. 150; A. C. Black, “The Institutional Writers, 1600–1826,” An
Introductory Survey of the Sources and Literature of Scots Law (Edinburgh: Stair Society,
1936) p. 61; and John C. Gardner, “French and Dutch Inuences,” An Introductory
Survey, pp. 226–34.
19For an overview of a French advocate’s school training, see Holmès, L’Eloquence
Judiciaire, pp. 18–24.
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would recommend the French “Plaidoyez” as models for forming
a style.20
Mackenzie’s interest in style was apparent in his rst publica-
tion—a novel entitled Arentina, the Serious Romance (1660). In “An
Apologie for Romances” prefaced to the novel, Mackenzie explains
that “it was to form to my self a style that I undertook this Piece.”21
In discussing different kinds of style, Mackenzie’s basis of division
is professions. The rst is “an university style” which involves use
of Latin and Greek terms in a manner that interferes with persua-
sion (p. 9). The second style “is that of moral Philosophers”—short
periods and strong sense—which “suits best with Preachers” (p. 9).
The third “is that of Barrasters.” Signicantly, he describes this style
as most preferable. This is because it “is ourished with similees”
and uses “long winded periods” (p. 9). A fourth style is that of the
courtier. In this case “the cadence is sweet, and the epithets well
adapted, without any other varnish whatsoever” (p. 10). However, it
is susceptible to abuse: he mentions “a ridiculous caball of Ladies
at Paris . . . who paraphrase every thing they speak of, terming a
mirrour, the conselour of beauty, and a chair, the commoditie of
conversation, &c.” (p. 10).
Given Mackenzie’s attention to different kinds of style, it is
not surprising to nd him attempting to fashion himself a wit.
The English poet John Dryden described Mackenzie as “that no-
ble wit of Scotland.”22 The conceits Mackenzie uses in the pref-
ace to Arentina and later works, including “What Eloquence,” are
reminiscent of the kinds of metaphysical conceits found in the po-
etry of Donne, Jonson, and Cowley, to name just three of the au-
thors of whom Mackenzie approves in his poem Caelia’s Coun-
try House and Closet (1667). In Religio Stoici (1663), for example,
Mackenzie advises against debate in spiritual matters with this
conceit: “none but God’s Spirit can decide the Controversy. Mat-
ters of Religion and Faith, resembling some curious Pictures, and
Optick Prisms, which seem to change Shapes and Colours, ac-
20Mackenzie recommends that the advocate use his own pleadings, those of
Cicero, or those of the French to form his voice to pronunciation of gures (pp. 71–72).
See also his inaugural oration (p. 66).
21I have used the reprint of “Apologie” by the Augustan Reprint Society in Prefaces
to Four Seventeenth-Century Romances (Los Angeles: Clark Memorial Library, 1953) p.
10.
22Quoted in Cairns, “Mackenzie,” p. 19.
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cording to the several Stances from which the Aspicient views
them.”23
Religio Stoici is in part Mackenzie’s response to the civil wars.
A key part of the conict was the crown’s attempt to impose epis-
copacy on Scotland. While Mackenzie was studying in Aberdeen,
Dundee was sacked and its citizens massacred.24 Aberdeen was not
sympathetic to Covenanters, and Mackenzie certainly did not sym-
pathize with them.25 Whereas in “Apologie” Mackenzie’s views of a
preaching style are relatively supercial and uncritical, three years
later in Religio Stoici he takes preachers to task for the “Blood-thirsty
Zeal, which hath reigned in our Age” (p. 43). Mackenzie blames the
knowledge formed by “the Curiosity of School-men, and the Bigotry
of Tub-preachers” to be “of all others the least necessary, and the
most dangerous” (p. 51).
Prior to Pleadings, Mackenzie also published essays on topics
such as solitude and gallantry. As Mackenzie reports in Pleadings,
“When I was too young to write in my own Profession, my Love to
my Country tempted me to write Moral Philosophy, and to adventure
on a Play and Poem” (p. 10). Certainly patriotic motives were also
relevant to his legal publications.26 At the time Mackenzie wrote
“What Eloquence,” there were few Scottish legal materials in print.27
In the preface to Pleadings Mackenzie identies this as a motive
for publishing the work: “[t]he Laws of other Nations are opprest,
but ours is starv’d. This made me adventure to write these few
Sheets” (p. 10).28 This situation would change less than a decade later
23Works, vol. 1, p. 42. See also “Apologie,” pp. 6, 7. Compare for example Donne’s
“The Bait,” Jonson’s “The Houre-Glasse,” and especially Cowley’s “Ode: Of Wit.” For
Caelia’s Country-House and Closet, see Works, vol. 1, p. 17.
24J. D. Mackie, A History of Scotland, 2nd edn, rev. and ed. Bruce Lenman and
Geoffrey Parker (London: Penguin, 1978) p. 224.
25David Stevenson, King’s College, Aberdeen, 1560–1641: From Protestant Reforma-
tion to Covenanting Revolution (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1990) pp. 105–12;
Lang, Sir George MacKenzie, pp. 23–24.
26See Cairns, “Mackenzie,” pp. 20–23.
27Walker, Jurists, pp. 114–15, 150 n.18. For a brief overview of Scotland and
its courts during the Commonwealth, Protectorate, and Restoration, see David M.
Walker, The Scottish Legal System: An Introduction to the Study of Scots Law, 3rd edn,
rev. (Edinburgh: Green, 1969) pp. 153–56.
28Mackenzie may have intended Pleadings to contribute to the materials of Scots
law. He suggests this in a comment in his inaugural oration where he discusses the
library’s holdings in Scottish municipal law: “Their numbers are small for the reason
that the Scottish character nds it more natural to express in forensic speeches and
judgments what might have been written, than to put their speeches and judgments
into literary form” (p. 71).
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when Stair’s Institutions, the rst systematic, authoritative treatment
of Scots law, was published. The efforts of Mackenzie and other
Scottish legal professionals should be understood as part of a broader
European trend associated with the rise of the nation-state, when
countries turned their attention away from commentaries on the civil
law to the development of municipal law.29
As for pleading, advocates must have believed that at least some-
times eloquence was useless. The judicial system was known for
corruption. Mackenzie mentions it in his inaugural oration for the
Advocates’ Library (p. 71), and legal historians concur that the cor-
ruption in the administration of justice throughout the seventeenth
century was well known to contemporaries: judges and their fam-
ilies as well as court ofcials were bribed and intimidated by the
Crown.30 Legal historians also mention abuses of judicial eloquence,
as advocates made lengthy speeches before both the civil and crimi-
nal courts.31 Certainly there must have been motives for advocates
to parade their so-called eloquence in law courts;32 and Mackenzie’s
“What Eloquence” indicates some of them.
Mackenzie was rst admitted to the Scottish bar in 1659. In 1661
his defense of the Marquis of Argyll, accused of high treason and
brought before parliament, did not enable Argyll to escape convic-
tion, but it did bring Mackenzie notice and advance his reputation.33
He was promoted to Justice Depute in November 1661 and served
until 1663. In the following years he continued his legal work, in-
cluding defenses of accused witches,34 and was active in the business
of the Faculty of Advocates. He became advocate for the town of
Dundee in 1665, was knighted in 1666, and was elected to parlia-
29Klaus Luig, “The Institutes of National Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries,” trans. Sabine MacCormack, Juridical Review 17 (1972) p. 216.
30See, for example, Omond, The Lord Advocates, cit in n. 1 above, pp. 172–73; J.
Irvine Smith, “Criminal Procedure,” An Introduction to Scottish Legal History, p. 439
and “Rise,” p. 46; and John Macpherson Pinkerton, “Introduction,” The Minute Book
of the Faculty of Advocates: 1661–1712, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: Stair Society, 1976) p. xiii.
31J. Irvine Smith, “Criminal Procedure,” p. 439.
32Rajit S. Dosanjh, “The ‘eloquence of the Bar’: Hugh Blair’s Lectures, profes-
sionalism and Scottish legal education,” The Scottish Invention of English Literature, ed.
Robert Crawford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) pp. 57–59 has also
mentioned Mackenzie’s interest in promoting the professional status of Scots advo-
cates, as well as restricting the profession to a select few. Dosanjh focuses on knowledge
as the excluding factor, and certainly eloquence could serve the same purpose.
33See Lang, Sir George MacKenzie, pp. 31–39 on the case and Mackenzie, Pleadings,
pp. 80–84 for a defense speech.
34See Pleadings, pp. 84–89 for a defense speech.
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ment in 1669.35 Thus Mackenzie was active in high legal and po-
litical circles, and eloquence served in part as an entrée to these
circles.
Contents of “What Eloquence is Fit for the Bar”
According to the preface to Pleadings, Mackenzie composed the work
“to inform Strangers as to our Way of Pleading in Scotland, to form
to myself a Stile, and to give me an Easiness in Pleading” (p. 10).
His comments on his own experiences as a young pleader (p. 10)
and on common faults of young pleaders (p. 16) suggest an intended
audience of advocates in the early stages of their careers.
“What Eloquence is t for the Bar” is twenty-seven paragraphs
in length. Mackenzie praises and defends judicial eloquence (¶1–
11); covers the traditional ofces of the orator (¶12–23), excluding
memory and discussing them with respect to Scots law; and closes
with an encomium to the Scottish tongue (¶24), defense of modern
eloquence (¶25–26), and brief display of modesty (¶27).
Praise and defense of judicial eloquence
Mackenzie’s praise of judicial eloquence begins with praise of the
advocate’s eloquence over that of “Rivals for this great Honour” (p.
11). The advocate’s eloquence is superior to that of courtiers and
preachers because his topics are signicant and he meets with real
opposition. Against the opinions of some divines and philosophers,
he argues that Scots law, with the variety of actionsand circumstances
and its statues, customs, and cases, “must afford much Room for
new and subtile Conclusions” (p. 12). Signicantly, he remarks that
those who prefer advocacy as a profession do so in “the joint Hopes
of Glory, Applause, Preferment, Money and Emulation” (p. 12).
Virtually absent are topics of civic signicance; Mackenzie does not
praise the advocate’s eloquence for bolstering legal courts as an
institution or for achieving justice, but for bringing the advocate
personal fame and professional status.36
Mackenzie defends judicial eloquence against three charges.
First, it cannot work for “old and reverend Judges” who are moved
35See Cairns, “Mackenzie,” pp. 18–19; Lang, Sir George MacKenzie, pp. 78, 160.
36Mackenzie’s “Idea eloquentiae forensis hodierni” also features professional
competition in its defense of judicial eloquence (Works, pp. 105–06).
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only “by solid Reason” (p. 12). Mackenzie attempts to dissociate elo-
quence from mere ornamentation and ties it to propriety of argument.
When discussing statutes and authorities, the terms chosen should be
“signicant” and “seem full of the Thing which they are to express;”
reasons are to be provided “handsomly;” debate on probable themes,
inquiry into public utility, and discussion of presumptive arguments
are to involve “a more orid and elegant Stile” (p. 12). Moreover,
eloquence is sure to charm: the judge “must be very just, who is not
somewhat brib’d by charming Expressions” (p. 12).37
Second, it should not be allowed in a court “since no Passions
are allowed in judging, and the Object of that excellent Science be-
ing Truth, and not Humour” (p. 12). But, Mackenzie argues, elo-
quence enhances the advocate’s ability to invent arguments because it
“thaws” (p. 12) the speaker’s faculties. The hearers are also “warm’d
and thawed” by eloquence, and consequently more receptive to “Im-
pressions” made by the speaker’s eloquence (p. 12; see also p. 14).
Mackenzie concedes that eloquence “should be pardon’d some lit-
tle Dangerousness” since it “may bribe and corrupt Judges;” but he
defends it on providential grounds: “Nor can I think but that Provi-
dence has ordain’d it for the Bar, to soften and sweeten Humours,
which would else, by constant sticking at mere Law, become too
rigid and severe, and to divert and ease the Spirits of both Judges
and Advocates, which are too much upon the Rack, and bended for
the Service of their Country” (p. 12).
Third, it is illegal by an Act of Sederunt prescribing syllogistic
rather than rhetorical pleading (p. 12). Mackenzie blames the exis-
tence of this act on “the Ignorance of those Times” which blinded
“even Italy and France” (p. 13). He places most of the blame for
the act on the clerical membership of the Court at its institution
and their clerical training: the court consisted “of an equal Number
of Churchmen and Laics, and the President being an Ecclesiastic,
these Churchmen having the Advantage of Learning and Authority,
did form that Act of Sederunt according to their own breeding, by
which they were tied to their Theology-schools to debate by Syllo-
gisms” (pp. 12–13). Mackenzie illustrates the inappropriateness of
syllogisms for arguing a case in part by distinguishing proper legal
expression from expression in mathematics, medicine, natural phi-
losophy, logic, metaphysics, and theology. The syllogism, he argues,
37See also Mackenzie’s preface to Arentina where he describes eloquence as a way
of making virtue palatable (p. 8).
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is “very ridiculous, and impossible” for legal pleading (p. 13).38 He
concludes the argument by asking whether there “are any Creatures
alive so litigious as some Divines and Philosophers, who debate only
in Syllogisms?” (p. 13).
Mackenzie’s last topic is copious pleading. He defends the “full
and copious Way” (p. 13) of pleading in part with reference to
classical Greek and Roman traditions of judicial speaking and to
its practice in France “where Pleading is in its greatest Perfection”
(p. 13). The pleader, he argues, should plead fully in order to not
wrong his client and in order to make sure that at least one of his
arguments appeals to each judge sitting in the Court of Session (pp.
13–14). Mackenzie recommends shorter pleading in the Outer House,
where new decisions should not be made, and fuller pleading in the
Inner House in cases “where the Cause is new and fertile” (p. 14).39
Stepping outside these bounds can “vex an unwilling Judge, who will
think that he loves not to hear, mere Affectation and Vanity” (p. 14).
Affectation of copious eloquence as well as brevity could also lead
to censure from fellow advocates. Mackenzie blames “Envy” as the
reason why “Backbiters” inconsistently criticize the same pleader for
“too luxurient” pleading “because in the Inner-house he used the full
Allowance,” and for being “a lazy Pleader” because “in the Outer-
house he thought it impertinent to make Speeches, where a short
Defence is only necessary” (p. 14).
Ofces of the orator
Invention and arrangement: Mackenzie’s discussion of invention
and arrangement does not follow the traditional order of exordium,
narration, and so on, because these parts do not correspond to Scots
legal procedure.40 Mackenzie begins at the beginning of the process,
distinguishing it from ancient and modern French practice. While
ancient and French pleaders include a preface and epilogue, the
Scottish pleader “relates only the Cause, which he is only allow’d
38Syllogisms apparently had a role in questions of the relevancy of an indictment.
See J. Irvine Smith, “Criminal,” p. 439.
39Briey, the Court of Session consisted of an Outer House and an Inner House.
In the Outer House, three of the fteen Lords of Session sat in rotation and settled
matters of evidence or procedure or minor questions. Other questions were sent to the
Inner House, where all fteen judges usually sat or at least nine which constituted
a quorum.
40Mackenzie’s Latin essay on judicial eloquence, in contrast, organizes arrange-
ment around traditional heads. Mackenzie, Works, Vol. 1, pp. 108–10.
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to adorn with a pertinent Representation of such Circumstances, as
may best, either astruct the Justice of his own Pursuit, or obviate
unnecessary Objections in his Opponent, but without mentioning
any Thing pro or con, in jure” (p. 14). The defender then offers a short
defense. If its relevance is contested in a full reply, then the defense
makes a full answer. Mackenzie notes that the debate usually ends
at this point, although some causes require additional replies and
duplies, and “the Discourses become too thin and subtle, and the
Judges weary” (p. 14). In the replies or duplies, pleaders may use a
short preface for important causes, as long as it is relevant to the case
itself rather than a commonplace such as an excuse for the speaker’s
weakness. Mackenzie’s recommendations for arranging arguments
are to put together “such Arguments as have Contingency” and those
founded on the same general principle. He recommends beginning
with those that best clear a matter of fact or “tend most to illuminate
the Subject of the Discourse” (p. 15).
The next part of the procedure is answering the arguments.
Mackenzie blames “the Aristotelic Way of arguing in the Schools” (p.
15) for the custom of repeating the arguments which will be answered
because it takes time and wearies judges. He then notes variations in
how the answerer orders the arguments: he could follow the method
of the proponer, reorder the method, urge his own arguments rst,
and so on. He recommends occasions when the strongest arguments
should be placed rst, that related arguments be kept together, and
that “mysterious Arguments” be left until last “when Judges have
fully master’d the Case” (p. 16).
Mackenzie’s report of the epilogue rst notes that it “is ordinarily,
In respect whereof, the Defence ought to be admitted, or repell’d, &c.
But in some solemn Cases the Pleader may recapitulate shortly his
strongest Arguments, or may urge the Favour and Merits of the
Cause” (p. 16).
Delivery: Mackenzie observes that in the past delivery was “one
of the chief Ornaments of Speech . . . But now the World is become
too wise to be taken by the Eye, albeit I confess these add Grace, tho’
not Force” (p. 16). He confesses that Scottish delivery “is possibly
too violent, which I ascribe both to the violent Temper of our Na-
tion, praeservidum Scotorum ingenium, and to the Way of our Debate”
(p. 16). Mackenzie provides the traditional lore that a speaker who
does not show passion cannot raise it in others, but does so in the
non-traditional language of physiology: since “Passion does disor-
der very much the kindled Speaker,” those with “hot and choleric
Spirits should calm themselves before they adventure to enter upon
a serious Debate,” “the bashful” should be “warm’d, and . . . lose
R H E T O R I C A286
prudently a little of their indiscreet Modesty,” and “Melancholic Per-
sons” also “need to be a little fretted” (p. 16). Passion also prevents
those who fear interruption from stammering, because passion keeps
the speaker focused on what he is speaking (p. 16). Mackenzie rec-
ommends against railing and displays of fury, but notes cases where
“not to be severe were Prevarication” (p. 16).
Style: Mackenzie covers the subject in three paragraphs. The
rst makes four recommendations. Speakers should not be too sub-
tle, and they should avoid citations, parentheses, and frequent rep-
etition of “the ordinary Compellations; such as, My Lord Chan-
cellor, or My Lord President” (p. 16). The second again recom-
mends a copious style over a laconic. The third indicates cultural
competition between advocates and gentlemen. He observes that
“Many who are not Friends to the Bar, inveigh much at the cant-
ing Terms which they say is us’d there”–namely, those “Gentlemen”
who “speak in their canting Terms of Hunting, Hawking, Danc-
ing” (p. 17). But, argues Mackenzie, “every Science has its particular
Terms, and it were Pedantry to substitute others in their Place” (p.
17). Mackenzie’s discussion of appropriate terms extends to using
appropriate Latin terms and “the genuin Words of our Municipal
Law” (p. 17).
Encomium to the Scottish tongue
Mackenzie compares the Scottish tongue to the English and
French. He lists reasonswhy “the Scottish Idiom of the British Tongue
is more t for Pleading, than either the English Idiom or the French
Tongue” (p. 17). Mackenzie suggests that the Scottish have a national
character appropriate for pleading, “for certainly a Pleader must use
a brisk, smart, and quick Way of speaking; whereas the English, who
are a grave Nation, use a too slow and grave Pronunciation, and
the French a too soft and effeminate one. And therefore, I think the
English is t for Haranguing, the French for Complementing, but the
Scots for Pleading” (p. 17). Mackenzie then links national character
to national institutions: “Our Pronunciation is like ourselves, rely,
abrupt, sprightly, and bold; their greatest Wits being employ’d at
Court, have indeed enrich’d very much their Language as to Con-
versation; but all our’s bending themselves to study the Law, the
chief Science in Repute with us, hath much smooth’d our Language,
as to Pleading” (p. 17). Scots law, he suggests, offers more scope for
eloquence than English law with its full and authoritative statutes
and decisions.
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Mackenzie compares the idioms of people of the same social level
in Scotland and England: “Nor can I enough admire, why some of
the wanton English undervalue so much our Idiom, since that of
our Gentry differs little from their’s; nor do our Commons speak so
rudely as these of Yorkshire” (p. 17). He then associates with French
those words in Scottish which differ from English, such as “Cannel
for Cinnamon, and Servit for Napkin,” because “if the French Tongue
be at least equal to the English, I see not why our’s should be worse
than it” (p. 17).
After noting that the Scottish accent “is natural, and has nothing,
at least little, in it that is peculiar” (p. 17) and that it allows Scots
to pronounce foreign languages including Latin best, he concludes
with a disclaimer: “I say this not to asperse the English, they are a
Nation I honour, but to reprove the petulancy and Malice of some
amongst them, who think they do their Country good Service when
they reproach our’s” (p. 17). Certainly, though, Mackenzie wants to
bolster the status of Scots by suggesting that their eloquence is equal
if not superior to that of their rivals.
Ancients versus moderns
Mackenzie answers those who claim that eloquence has declined
since Cicero’s time, objecting to those “Pedants” who “make Cicero
the Standard” (p. 17). Mackenzie argues that eloquence improves
over time as people become wiser with age, because it improves by
practice and, through experience, we learn the humors of the au-
dience better, we learn what forms and sounds please most, and
new inventions are added to those of the last age (p. 17). Macken-
zie admits that the ancients had greater subjects and occasions for
eloquence, but answers that it is possible to speak well on lesser
subjects and occasions. He also suggests features of the Scottish le-
gal system–more laws, parallels, and citations–which provide more
scope for eloquence than ancient legal systems. Finally, he argues
that monarchy promotes eloquence more than commonwealths: he
has “not seen any Switzer, or Hollander, so eloquent as the English
or French,” and in a commonwealth those who attempt “to rise above
the Vulgar are carefully depress’d, and sunk down to a Level” (p. 18).
Given that Mackenzie had lived through the Commonwealth, Pro-
tectorate, and Restoration, political motives must be at work here. In
addition, we see a desire to maintain social hierarchy and eloquence
as a marker of status.
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Conclusion
In the years following the publication of Pleadings, Mackenzie con-
tinued to advance in his career. He was appointed King’s Advocate
in 1677. At this time he earned his nickname of “bluidy Mackenzie”
for prosecution of covenanters. In 1678 he published an important
work on Scottish criminal law, in 1681 he published Idea eloquen-
tiae forensis hodierni, and in 1682 he became Dean of the Faculty of
Advocates. In 1688 he published his Institutions of the Law of Scot-
land and in 1689 gave the inaugural oration at the formation of the
Advocates’ Library, later the National Library of Scotland. In this
oration Mackenzie identies rhetoric as one of the handmaidens of
jurisprudence.41 Mackenzie went to Oxford shortly thereafter as he
was strongly identied with the governments of Charles II and James
VII. He died in 1691, the year when his Vindication of the Government
in Scotland. During the Reign of King Charles II was published. Thus
Mackenzie’s legal and political career and writings continued, as well
as his attention to and practice of eloquence. His career indicates that
its personal, professional, and political stakes were high.
The survey of Mackenzie’s “What Eloquence is Fit for the Bar”
shows that Mackenzie is less interested in bolstering the credibility
of legal institutions than in promoting the status of Scots advocates
against their rivals at court and in the schools and pulpits, and
against their rivals in England. Judicial eloquence in post-Restoration
Scotland was a site of struggle for individual and professional status.
It was also part of a struggle for national, cultural identity and status
vis-à-vis England.
41See his inaugural oration, p. 73.
